Somewhere between the loan paperwork and the first missed payment, almost every borrower is told the same thing: student loans cannot be discharged in bankruptcy. Not hard to discharge — impossible. It is the one piece of bankruptcy law that non-lawyers believe they know for certain, and it is wrong.
It is also wrong for a reason worth naming. In its November 2022 guidance to its own attorneys, the Department of Justice recorded that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau had found loan servicers “falsely but affirmatively represented to borrowers that loans were never dischargeable in bankruptcy.” The myth was not merely absorbed from the air. It was, in some cases, told to people by the companies collecting from them.
What the statute actually says is narrower, and conditional.
Read the opening clause of § 523 (a) (8)
Section 523 (a) (8) of the Bankruptcy Code excepts educational debt from discharge — but it opens with a condition, not a prohibition: “unless excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph would impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor’s dependents.” The exception to discharge is itself subject to an exception. Student loans are not in the category Congress built for debts incurred by fraud or by drunk driving; they are in a category of their own, dischargeable on a showing the Code declines to define.
What falls inside the paragraph is broader than most borrowers assume. It reaches an educational benefit overpayment or a loan “made, insured, or guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made under any program funded in whole or in part by a governmental unit or nonprofit institution” (subpar. (A) (i)); an obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit, scholarship, or stipend (subpar. (A) (ii)); and any other educational loan that is a “qualified education loan” as defined in section 221 (d) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code (subpar. (B)). That last branch is where private loans live, and it is a definition with edges — a private debt that does not satisfy it is not protected by § 523 (a) (8) at all, and goes out with the ordinary unsecured debt.
Nor does chapter 13 offer a side door. Section 1328 (a) (2) carries paragraph (8) of § 523 (a) forward into the completion discharge, so completing a chapter 13 plan does not by itself erase what remains of a student loan.
Nothing happens unless you start a lawsuit inside your own bankruptcy
This is the procedural fact that defeats most of the people who were right about the law. An undue-hardship discharge is not something the bankruptcy court considers on its own, and it is not something a chapter 7 trustee raises for you. It requires an adversary proceeding — a separate civil action, with a complaint and a defendant, filed within the bankruptcy case.
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7001 lists what must proceed that way, and “a proceeding to determine whether a debt is dischargeable” is on the list. One note for anyone reading older material: the Bankruptcy Rules were restyled effective December 1, 2024, and the paragraphs of Rule 7001 were relettered in the process. What was Rule 7001 (6) for decades is now Rule 7001 (f). The requirement did not change; the citation did.
So the sequence matters. A discharge order entered in an ordinary chapter 7 case says nothing about the student loan, because nobody asked it to. The borrower who assumed the loan went out with the credit cards has not lost a case. He has not filed one.
The Seventh Circuit’s test, and why Wisconsin cases turn on it
Wisconsin sits in the Seventh Circuit, and the Seventh Circuit decided in 1993 which framework governs. In In re Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir. 1993), the court expressly declined an invitation to adopt a more forgiving multi-factor approach and instead adopted the test from Brunner v. New York State Higher Education Services Corp., 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987). Undue hardship requires a three-part showing: that the debtor cannot maintain, on current income and expenses, a minimal standard of living for himself and his dependents if forced to repay; that additional circumstances exist indicating this state of affairs is likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment period; and that the debtor has made good faith efforts to repay.
Roberson also set the order of operations. The first prong is the starting point, because information about present finances is “concrete and readily obtainable,” and only if the debtor meets it should a court examine the other two. And each element is required: as the court put it in Tetzlaff v. Educational Credit Management Corp., 794 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2015), a debtor must satisfy every element of the Brunner test to have the loans discharged. Failing one is failing.
Two Seventh Circuit cases, opposite results, same test
The pair is instructive, and both are worth knowing before anyone decides what their own case looks like.
In Krieger v. Educational Credit Management Corp., 713 F.3d 882 (7th Cir. 2013), the bankruptcy judge discharged the debt; a district judge reversed, partly on the ground that the debtor had not enrolled in a long-term income-based repayment program and so had not shown good faith. The Court of Appeals reinstated the discharge, and its reasoning repays attention. If good faith required a commitment to future payment, the court observed, “no educational loan ever could be discharged, because it is always possible to pay in the future should prospects improve.” Then the sentence that practitioners quote: “It is important not to allow judicial glosses, such as the language in Roberson and Brunner, to supersede the statute itself.” And on the repayment-plan point specifically — to the extent the district judge believed debtors must always agree to a payment plan and forgo a discharge, that was “a proposition of law—an incorrect proposition.”
The gloss Krieger had in mind is Roberson’s own compression of the three criteria into a “certainty of hopelessness.” Krieger acknowledged that this “sounds more restrictive than the statutory ‘undue hardship’” — a candid admission that the shorthand had drifted from the text.
Tetzlaff is the mirror, and it is a Wisconsin case: a Waukesha debtor in his mid-fifties, living with his elderly mother and subsisting on her Social Security income, who had pursued an M.B.A. at Marquette and a law degree at a Florida law school and had not passed a bar examination. The bankruptcy court found he met the first prong but neither of the other two. The Eastern District of Wisconsin affirmed, and so did the Seventh Circuit.
Two findings carried it. On additional circumstances, the bankruptcy court found his situation capable of improvement — he had the M.B.A., was a good writer, was intelligent, and the family difficulties that had consumed earlier years were largely over. On good faith, he had not paid down the debt he was trying to discharge, and argued that payments he had made on a different educational debt — owed directly to one of his schools, and not part of the discharge action — should count in his favour. The Court of Appeals declined to require that, noting the bankruptcy court’s observation that he had repaid the school largely because he needed its cooperation to release his diploma and transcript.
The lesson is not that education defeats a claim. It is that prongs two and three are intensely factual, that the findings are made at trial in the bankruptcy court where they will usually stay, and that good faith is measured against the particular loan in front of the court.
Carrying student-loan debt you cannot pay? The rules are mechanical. Applying them to your actual balance sheet is not. Carson Law Office has practiced in Milwaukee and Waukesha County for over thirty years. Call (262) 860-8932 or schedule a consultation.
What the 2022 Justice Department guidance changed
On November 17, 2022, the Department of Justice issued, in coordination with the Department of Education, a guidance memorandum for the government lawyers who defend these cases. It did not amend § 523 (a) (8) — no executive-branch memorandum can — but it changed how the United States behaves when the borrower is on the other side.
Under the guidance, Department attorneys are advised to stipulate to the facts establishing undue hardship and recommend discharge where three conditions are met: the debtor presently lacks an ability to repay; that inability is likely to persist; and the debtor acted in good faith in the past in attempting to repay. To get there, the borrower is typically asked to complete an attestation form about income, expenses, assets, and repayment history. Present ability to pay is assessed against the Internal Revenue Service Collection Financial Standards — the same tables the IRS uses for what a taxpayer and family need to live. Future inability carries a rebuttable presumption in defined circumstances, including that the debtor is 65 or older, has a disability or chronic injury affecting earning potential, has been unemployed for at least five of the last ten years, failed to obtain the degree the loan financed, or has had the loan in a non-school payment status for at least ten years.
On good faith, the guidance is deliberately generous. A single step can evidence it — making a payment, applying for a deferment or forbearance, applying for an income-driven plan, applying for a consolidation loan, responding to a servicer’s outreach, or engaging meaningfully with the Department of Education or the servicer about options. It directs attorneys to look at the entire life of the loan rather than recent history, and says that where other evidence of good faith exists, failure to repay, or inconsistent or limited repayment, does not indicate a lack of good faith. It also contemplates partial discharge, where the court discharges part of the balance and requires payment of the rest. The Civil Division still publishes the guidance and its attestation form among its public documents.
Two limits must be stated plainly, because the guidance states them itself. First, it is internal Department of Justice policy — “not intended to and does not create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any matter.” It is a litigating position, and a litigating position can be revised. Second, the government’s view does not bind the judge: the bankruptcy court renders its own determination whether the standard is met, and the debtor retains the burden of proof on every element in the adversary proceeding. A stipulation from the United States is an enormous practical advantage. It is not a discharge.
What this means if you are carrying the debt in Wisconsin
The honest summary is neither the myth nor its opposite. Discharging a student loan is hard, the standard in this circuit is demanding, and most borrowers will not meet it. But it is not forbidden, the government’s own posture since 2022 has been markedly less adversarial than the folklore assumes, and the borrower who never files the adversary proceeding has not been refused anything. He has declined to ask.
The useful first step is not a legal conclusion. It is an inventory: which loans are federal and which are private, how long each has been in repayment, what was actually earned and spent over the life of the loan, whether the degree was finished, and what contact there has been with the servicer. Those are the facts the first Brunner prong and the attestation both run on, and they are knowable before anyone gives an opinion.
Talk to a New Berlin bankruptcy attorney
Carson Law Office handles chapter 7 and chapter 13 bankruptcy matters in New Berlin, Waukesha County, Milwaukee, West Allis, Wauwatosa, and the surrounding communities, including cases where educational debt is the largest number on the schedule. If you have been told your student loans can never be discharged, the first conversation worth having is about dates, income history, and what the loans actually are. Call (262) 860-8932 or email christopher@carsonlawoffice.com. You can also read more about our bankruptcy practice, our post on which debts bankruptcy can and cannot erase, and the means test that decides whether chapter 7 is available — or contact us to arrange a consultation.
Carson Law Office · 15350 West National Avenue, Suite 101, New Berlin, WI 53151 · (262) 860-8932
This article is general information about federal bankruptcy law and Wisconsin practice and is not legal advice. Statutes and rules are amended from time to time, reported decisions are subject to further review, agency guidance may be revised, and every case turns on its own facts. Speak with an attorney about your own case.