How a Criminal Appeal Works in Wisconsin: The Notice of Intent, the Twenty-Day Clock, and What a Direct Appeal Can and Cannot Fix

The single most consequential moment in a Wisconsin criminal appeal happens before anyone has written a brief, before any lawyer has read a transcript, and usually before the defendant has spent three weeks in custody. It is the filing of a one-page document in the circuit court — and the window for it is twenty days.

Most appeals that are lost are not lost on the law. They are lost on that calendar. What follows is the actual machinery of a direct appeal under Wisconsin law: what the first filing is, what each deadline does, and — the part that matters most to anyone considering it — the difference between what an appeal can fix and what it cannot.

The first filing is not the appeal

Under § 809.30 (2) (b), within 20 days after the date of sentencing the defendant must file in the circuit court, and serve on the prosecutor, a notice of intent to pursue postconviction relief. That is not a brief, not an argument, and not a notice of appeal. It is a declaration that the process is being invoked, and the rule tells you exactly what it must contain: the case name and number; an identification of the judgment or order and the date it was entered; the defendant’s name and address and trial counsel’s; whether trial counsel was appointed by the state public defender and, if so, whether the defendant’s finances have materially improved since indigency was determined; whether the defendant asks the public defender to appoint postconviction counsel; and, if not, whether he will proceed on his own or with retained counsel.

Note who is responsible for filing it. Section 809.30 (2) (a) provides that counsel representing the person at sentencing shall continue representation by filing a notice under paragraph (b) if the person wishes to pursue relief — unless counsel has been discharged by the client or allowed to withdraw by the court before the notice is due. Trial counsel’s job does not end when the judge imposes sentence. It ends, at the earliest, twenty days later.

And the rule has a small mercy built in: if the record shows that sentencing occurred after the notice was filed, the notice is treated as filed on the day of sentencing. Filing early does not forfeit anything.

What the clock does next

Everything after the notice is a sequence of fixed periods, each one triggered by the last. The point of the design, as the Judicial Council explained when the rule was written, was to put a time limit on every step so that appeals stopped taking two and three years.

  • 5 days — the clerk of circuit court sends the notice, the judgment, the list of court reporters, and the list of transcripts already filed either to the public defender’s appellate intake office or to the defendant or his retained lawyer. § 809.30 (2) (c).
  • 5 days — where trial counsel was appointed by the public defender and the notice asks for public defender representation on appeal, the prosecutor may ask the circuit court to have indigency redetermined before counsel is appointed or transcripts are requested. § 809.30 (2) (d).
  • 30 days — the state public defender must appoint postconviction counsel and request the transcript and a copy of the circuit court case record, measured from receipt of the clerk’s materials. If indigency has to be determined or redetermined first, that period is 50 days. § 809.30 (2) (e).
  • 30 days — a defendant who does not ask for the public defender must request the transcript himself, measured from the filing of the notice. A defendant who asked and was denied representation has 90 days. § 809.30 (2) (f). This is where unrepresented appeals most often die.
  • 60 days — the court reporter files the transcript and serves a copy; the clerk serves the circuit court case record. § 809.30 (2) (g).
  • 60 days — from the later of the service of the transcript or of the case record, the defendant files either a postconviction motion in the circuit court or a notice of appeal. § 809.30 (2) (h).
  • 60 days — the circuit court must decide a postconviction motion by order, or the motion is considered to be denied and the clerk immediately enters an order denying it. § 809.30 (2) (i). A silent court is not an indefinite delay; it is a denial.
  • 20 days — from entry of the order on the postconviction motion, the notice of appeal is filed in the circuit court. § 809.30 (2) (j).
  • 40 days — the clerk transmits the record to the court of appeals. § 809.30 (2) (k). From there the civil appellate procedures govern.

Section 808.04 (3) ties this together: in a criminal case, the time to initiate an appeal is not the ordinary 45 or 90 days that govern civil appeals, but the periods specified in § 809.30 (2) or § 809.32 (2). Counting from the wrong statute is a real and recurring error.

Why the motion usually comes before the appeal

Section 809.30 (2) (h) contains a requirement that surprises people: the defendant shall file a motion for postconviction relief before a notice of appeal is filed — unless the grounds for relief are the sufficiency of the evidence or issues previously raised. Section 974.02 (2) says the same thing from the other direction.

The reason is evidentiary. An appellate court reviews a record; it does not make one. If the claim is that trial counsel performed ineffectively, there is nothing in the trial record about why counsel did what he did, because nobody asked him. Wisconsin law closes that gap by requiring the question be put to him first: a prerequisite to an appellate claim of ineffective trial representation is the preservation of trial counsel’s testimony at a postconviction hearing in which the representation is challenged (State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1979)). That hearing is not automatic, either — it is owed when the motion alleges sufficient facts which, if true, would entitle the defendant to relief.

Sufficiency of the evidence is the standing exception. It can be raised on appeal as a matter of right even though it was never raised in the circuit court, because it differs in kind from other unpreserved challenges (State v. Hayes, 2004 WI 80, 273 Wis. 2d 1, 681 N.W.2d 203).

What a direct appeal can fix

An appeal is a claim that the circuit court made an identifiable error that mattered. Three features of Wisconsin law define the outer edge of what that gets you.

First, the error has to have made a difference. Section 805.18 (2) forbids reversal or a new trial for error in the selection or direction of the jury, the improper admission of evidence, or any matter of pleading or procedure unless the error “affected the substantial rights” of the party seeking relief. For constitutional error the formulation is more demanding of the State: error is harmless if it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error (State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189).

Second, there is a safety valve that does not depend on preservation at all. Under § 752.35, if it appears from the record that the real controversy has not been fully tried, or that it is probable that justice has for any reason miscarried, the court of appeals may reverse “regardless of whether the proper motion or objection appears in the record.” This discretionary reversal power is narrow in practice and should never be anyone’s plan, but it exists.

Third, a sentence can be attacked as a sentence. Section 973.19 provides a separate, faster route for a defendant whose only complaint is the severity of what was imposed — but it comes with a trap discussed below.

What a direct appeal cannot fix

It cannot retry the case. New witnesses, better explanations, and evidence nobody put in are not appellate material; they belong, if anywhere, to a motion in the circuit court, and newly discovered evidence must generally concern a fact that was true at the time of trial (State v. Watkins, 2021 WI App 37, 398 Wis. 2d 558, 961 N.W.2d 884).

It cannot resurrect a claim that was never preserved, as a general matter: a claim of constitutional right is waived unless timely raised in the trial court (Maclin v. State, 92 Wis. 2d 323, 284 N.W.2d 661 (1979)).

And it cannot be saved for later. This is the most important consequence of the whole structure. Section 974.06 (4) requires that all grounds for relief be raised in the original, supplemental, or amended motion, and bars any ground finally adjudicated, not raised, or knowingly and intelligently waived from being the basis of a subsequent motion absent a sufficient reason. Our supreme court gave that provision teeth: a defendant is prohibited from raising a constitutional issue in a § 974.06 motion if the claim could have been raised in a previously filed § 974.02 motion or on direct appeal (State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994)).

Read that together with the twenty-day notice and the shape of the thing becomes clear. The direct appeal is not the first of several opportunities. For most claims it is the only one, and the decision whether to invoke it is made in the three weeks after sentencing, which is exactly when a defendant is least able to think about it.

The traps worth naming

The sentence-modification waiver. Section 973.19 lets a person sentenced to imprisonment or ordered to pay a fine, who has not requested transcripts under § 809.30 (2), move within 90 days to modify the sentence or the fine. It is quicker. But subsection (5) is unambiguous: by filing that motion, the defendant waives his right to file an appeal or postconviction motion under § 809.30 (2). Trading the entire direct appeal for a sentence-only motion is a choice that should be made deliberately, not stumbled into.

The deadline that can be extended — and the one that cannot. Section 809.82 (2) (b) provides that the time for filing a notice of appeal of a final judgment may not be enlarged — but it expressly excepts appeals under § 809.30 and § 809.32. Criminal appellate deadlines are therefore among the few that the court of appeals may extend for good cause under § 809.82 (2) (a), and it may permit an act to be done after the time has run. This is not forgiveness and it is not automatic; it requires a motion and a reason. The Judicial Council’s note to § 809.30 records the court of appeals’ statement in State v. Rembert, 99 Wis. 2d 401, 299 N.W.2d 292 (Ct. App. 1980), that its authority to extend these periods is to the exclusion of the trial court — so the motion goes to the right court, which is not the one that just sentenced you.

The no-merit report. If appointed postconviction counsel concludes a direct appeal would be frivolous and without any arguable merit within the meaning of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), § 809.32 (1) gives the client three options, which counsel must explain: have counsel file a no-merit report, have counsel close the file without an appeal, or have counsel close the file and proceed without a lawyer or with retained counsel. If the client asks for the report or declines to consent to closing the file, the report must be filed — and it must identify anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal and explain why each issue lacks merit. The client may file a response. A no-merit report is not the end of the matter; it is a document the client is entitled to argue with.

A note on what this is really about

Appellate work is a different craft from trial work. The record is closed, the audience is three judges reading rather than twelve citizens listening, and the question is almost never “what happened” but “what the law required of the court that decided what happened.” It rewards close reading, patience with procedural detail, and a willingness to argue from the transcript rather than from sympathy.

It also rewards speed at exactly one point: the twenty days after sentencing. If there is any chance of an appeal, the notice of intent should be filed. It costs almost nothing, it commits the defendant to nothing further, and it preserves every option on this page.

Talk to a New Berlin criminal appeals attorney

Carson Law Office handles criminal defense and postconviction and appellate matters in New Berlin, Waukesha County, Milwaukee, West Allis, Wauwatosa, and the surrounding communities. If you or a family member was sentenced recently, the clock described above is already running, and the first conversation is short: what the date of sentencing was, whether a notice of intent has been filed, and what the record will support. Call (262) 860-8932 or email christopher@carsonlawoffice.com. You can also read more about our criminal defense practice, our post on how sentencing works in Wisconsin, and our post on what makes a criminal complaint defective — or contact us to arrange a consultation.

Carson Law Office · 15350 West National Avenue, Suite 101, New Berlin, WI 53151 · (262) 860-8932

This article is general information about Wisconsin appellate and postconviction procedure and is not legal advice. Statutes and rules of appellate procedure are amended from time to time, reported decisions are subject to further review, and every case turns on its own record and facts. Deadlines in criminal appeals are short and some cannot be recovered; speak with an attorney about your own case promptly.

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